I recently came across and article in The Atlantic, which reported that Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev had suggested that perhaps the suffix –stan was responsible for Kazakhstan’s low global profile. He mentioned Mongolia, as a country that continues to attract international attention despite its still small economy and population. Perhaps a name change would help Kazakhstan develop a stronger international profile, he mused.
There is really only one good Russian response to this: Здравствуйте! ('hello' or in this case more like a saracastic 'good morning'). On the one hand this could just have been a interesting idea that the President was playing around with, which has no serious implications for the future of the country or his perception of its position in world affairs. On the other hand, it could point to some serious misconceptions on Nazarbayev's part.
Let's start with the statement that Mongolia has somehow benefited as a result of not being called something like Mongolistan. But, for every available economic indicator, Kazakhstan greatly outperforms Mongolia. This is, naturally, to be expected. Kazakhstan is a oil producing state, has a much larger population, and was more developed at the dissolution of the Soviet Union, giving it a greater starting point. Just looking at FDI, Kazakhstan hosts a huge figure at $111.5 billion, while Mongolia stands at just $4.5 billion! Anecdotally, it is more that clear enough that many more businessmen, students, policy makers, and analysts take a direct interest in Kazakhstan than in Mongolia when it comes to current affairs (naturally, I would suspect that Mongolia can command more than its fair share of historians). While it is beyond the scope of this casual blog post to offer a full comparison, I feel confident in saying that Kazakhstan's international profile is significantly more pronounced than Mongolia's.
That said, I would suspect that Nazarbayev was more concerned with a different kind of indicator, namely something more related to soft power. (I detailed Mongolia's «small power» here). In this case, Mongolia is certainly outperforming Kazakhstan, and it has nothing to do with a little Perso-Turkic suffix. Mongolia is a proven democracy, and has consistently shown its committment to engaging with the international community and improving its own democratic credentials. While Mongolia has eshewed further deepening its relationship with the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan is part of the Eurasian Custom's Union and CIS, tieing it to the Russian Federation. While Mongolia has sought to further its relationship with the European Union and North America, Kazakhstan remains a difficult partner because of its authoritarian political system and continued abuses of basic civil/human rights. Even with these limitations, Kazakhstan does enjoy good relations with the E.U. and the United States, but the relationship remains limited, largely as a result of Kazakhstan's own domestic and foreign policy choices. While Mongolia has sought to rise above its own geographical position, Kazakhstan's leadership continues to avoid a more balanced relationship with the Russian Federation, to the direct detriment of its other foreign policy goals. (In fact, Kazakhstan's political system is also a key reason for the underdeveloped nature of Kazakhstan-Mongolian relations, outlined here).
At the end of the day, Kazakhstan's economy is stronger and its economic ties to North America and Europe outperform Mongolia on most indicators. If Kazakhstan has any lessons to learn from Mongolia it is that democracy matters as much as a domestic policy as a lever for diplomatic relations. Democracy matters, names and suffixs don't.
Iran seems to be one of the top crazies in the world today, probably on equal footing with North Korea. Still, there are some important themes in Iranian political development that point to larger problems not specific to the Near East.
When I look at countries where I have limited experience or exposure, I try to think in terms of historical developments leading to current conditions and then compare those developments against other countries. Let’s call it “Comparative Historical Swathing” or CHS, just to be fun. (God, please do not let my ridiculous terminology creations halt my career before it has begun). Iran is a useful example:
1) Iran is the heir to one of history’s great empires/civilizations. Probably no one ever really forgot that the Persian Empire was kind of a big deal, but it is often forgotten that Iran is the modern incarnation of a fascinating political-cultural civilization. It’s hard to give an exact number of how long the territory of Iran has been governed as a single political unit, but suffice to say that it is in the 1000s of years. The fall of imperial and royal rule in Persia was encouraged by European meddling in the country’s internal and external affairs. To see the extent of this manipulation, I suggest reading Peter Hopkirk’s The Great Game. Sure, it falls short of academically rigorous, but the history is solid, and it is a wonderfully engaging read.
2) From great power to European pawn is a not a safe combination. Looking just a little east of Iran, China has had a similar historical trajectory. From 1949-1990, China had a special place in the crazy list with all its leaping forward and cultural renovations. The PRC under Mao was a basket case in the same boat as North Korea and Iran today. After at least a 100 years of “humiliation” at the hands of colonial European powers, the Qing Dynasty collapsed in on itself, paving the way for an oppressive Nationalist regime, followed by communist control by 1949. In response to U.S. support for the Nationalist government’s oppressive policies, the CCP displayed anti-Western behavior, attempting to destabilize the current order by encouraging revolution abroad. Iran experienced the turmoil of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 as a national response to the abuse of the Western-supported Pahlavi regime. Their response mirrored that of Maoist China.
3) National Pride doesn’t go away; the need to reclaim greatness appears. A long instilled sense of national pride is confused by humiliation by the hands of an outside force, leading to the need to regain that cultural heritage of greatness. The U.S. has only been the world’s sole superpower for 23 years, and yet any talk of relative or absolute decline sends a chill down the average American’s political spine. Iran, as China before it, is seeking to reestablish its national greatness at any cost.
With those basics points in mind, Iran doesn’t really look any crazier than any other state (which is not to say sane…).That doesn’t mean, however, that I don’t think Iran is dangerous, if anything history would suggest that such a country is prone to violence and hyper-nationalism. What it does mean, is that in order to integrate Iran into the modern international system, the U.S. will have to treat Iran like the great power, that it inherently sees itself as. Iran will not react positively to bullying on the part of the U.S. or anyone else, and telling it that it cannot have nuclear capabilities almost forces it to adopt those technologies, least its position in the world be thought of anything less than equal with other great powers.
Mongolia’s Democratic Gains
The fourth and final post in the series summarizing key sections of my M.A. thesis, looks at what Mongolia has to gain from its democratic credentials. I have argued this point in previous posts, but present it here in relations to part 3 of the series.
The expression “not all that glitters is gold” is perhaps best rephrased for our purposes as “not all that democratizes will become a democracy”. When Mongolia became an official democracy, no one was sure how a small state with less than 3 million people would manage to produce a real democracy in-between the authoritarian PRC and the uncertain democratization of the newly established Russian Federation. However, all available indicators support that it accomplished just that.
Mongolia’s democratic transition was largely based on domestic political will. Real democratization ultimately is an “exercise in national political self-determination. True democratization has to be domestically driven otherwise it will lack legitimacy. Mongolia was ranked at 6.23 by Democracy Index 2011, 6.36 in 2010 , 6.6 in 2008 , and 6.6 and 2006 , on a 10 point scale, meaning that it has been consistently ranked as a “flawed democracy”, which while admitting its problems, firmly ranks Mongolia as a democracy above hybrid and authoritarian regimes. Freedom House has ranked Mongolia as “free” for all available years (2002-2012). Although Mongolia is still a developing democracy, it is hard to argue that it is not a functioning one. Signs of increased civil society engagement and contested election results are actually a sign of a thriving democratic system, where the ability to change the status quo is recognized and a number of political parties are competing against each other.
U.S. and E.U. support to Mongolian Democracy
High profile visits are an important indication of bilateral ties and entail some level of prestige and significance to relationships between nations. Between the U.S. and Mongolia, several high-profile visits have highlighted the slowly deepening relationship between these two distant countries, often making explicit mention to Mongolia’s democratic status (see Table 2 for a list of the most prominent visits).
2005: Rep. Dennis Hastert2005: President George Bush
2011: Vice-President Joe Biden
2012: Secretary of State Hilary Clinton
To the United States of America
1991: President Ochirbat
2001: Prime Minister Enkhbayar
2004: President Bagabandi
2011: President Elbegdorj
Outside of high-profile diplomacy, the U.S. has also signaled its support for Mongolia and the value it places on Mongolian democracy in a number of other statements and institutional mechanisms. The U.S.-Mongolia Friendship Caucus seeks to educate and inform U.S. politicians on Mongolia, focusing on Mongolia’s political system and the reform process. The International Republican Institute (IRI) began working in Mongolia in 1992, working explicitly to support democratic governance and institutional development. In 2010, the U.S. Embassy hosted events celebrating the 20th anniversary of Mongolia’s “decision for democracy”, during which then-Ambassador Addleton identified democracy as one of five pillars of U.S.-Mongolian relations. In July 2011, Mongolia was granted Presidency of the Community of Democracies, and will host a meeting of the organization in 2013. The organization makes clear reference to Mongolia as an example of successful democratization and simultaneous political and economic transitions.
The United States recognizes that Mongolia is an important partner as it continues to shift its diplomatic focus to the Asia-Pacific. Mongolia is a U.S./international successful story for democratization and has been held up as a model of Asian democratization, in particular. The U.S. has stated that its goals in Mongolia are not geostrategic in nature, and that the U.S. is, instead, focused on helping develop “a base of democracy” in Mongolia. Mongolian democracy contributes to the country’s stability in an area defined by such authoritarian powers as Russia and China. The United States sees its own security as dependent on the domestic political stability of other states, and sees Mongolia’s democratic system as a potential balancing force against authoritarianism in the region.
Mongolia’s proven commitment to democracy is also in line with E.U. global goals, particularly as they concern Central Asia. Mongolia’s accession to the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) in Europe on November 22, 2012 is a clear indication that Europe and Mongolia are coming closer together on a number of issues. As the official announcement was being made, the OSCE Secretary General noted that Mongolia’s participation would allow the organization to better tackle transnational issues, while Mongolia stood to benefit from the OSCE’s expertise in democratic transitions. These shared values are defined as respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements also explicitly support democratic development. The U.S. responded to this announcement in a similar fashion, citing the accession as an indicator of Mongolia’s importance to the democratic community as an example of a successful transition from communism to democracy. A number of European development projects in Mongolia are handled directly by the European Institute for Democracy and Human Rights, which aims to encourage democratic institutional reform and support for human rights, specifically regarding the rights of inmates and sexual minorities. Furthermore, Germany’s Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) political foundation has taken an active role in supporting Mongolia’s democratization through seminar trainings and programs to strengthen decentralization efforts. Europe began developing relations with democratic Mongolia at a slower pace than the United States, but the proximity of Eastern Europe to Eurasia and a shared history between Mongolia and many Eastern European nations under the Soviet Union sets the groundwork for more multifaceted relations in the future.
Mongolian democracy stands out in stark contrast to it neighbors, Russia and China, as well as across the larger post-communist world, such as the Central Asian authoritarian states Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Despite all its “robustness/rowdiness”, the Mongolian political system is clearly democratic. A perfect democracy where all citizens have an equal say and where the government is equally responsive to all its citizens’ demands does not exist. From Hilary Clinton’s statement in Ulaanbaatar in support of democratization, it can be observed that Mongolia is becoming one of the poster countries for democracy and the rewards, stability, and development benefits that are associated with this political system. Mongolia can be held against claims that democracy is not for Asia. This is by no means meant to suggest that Mongolia’s own motivation in democratizing was to attract “Western” favor; rather, the point is that once democratized, the benefits to the Mongolian state and population were international as well domestic.
At the same time, Mongolia has been able to actively leverage its democratic credentials as part of its efforts to adapt to the post-communist international system and fulfill its “third neighbor policy.” Mongolia’s Concept of Foreign Policy states that the country’s foreign policy is guided by international norms such as respect for human rights and freedoms. The Concept of National Security of Mongolia identifies the country’s democratic government as key to the state’s continued security in the sectors of civil rights and information security. Furthermore, Mongolia’s democratic government distinguishes it a region defined by Russia, China, and the Central Asian states.
Does democracy matter? It seems that democracy is a potential tool that Mongolia can and has used to increase its attractiveness as a partner for U.S., E.U., and potentially other leading democracies. Attracting this interest is a key factor in Mongolia’s foreign policy, since it allows Mongolia to command a larger number of “third neighbors” as a counterbalance to Russian and especially Chinese influence. It is crucial that Mongolia implements a strong policy of diversification. Indeed, as a small state between giants, it knows only too well that over dependence on any one power will not afford it the sovereignty and autonomous decision-making power that it needs to survive as an independent state. If Mongolia’s democratization was not a factor and the country’s natural resources, growing economy, and/or strategic location were the only factors influencing relations with the U.S. and E.U., we might still expect some diplomatic gestures (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are also OSCE participating states). However, we would not see the level of high profile visits, the institutional support, or rhetorical references to Mongolia as a responsible stakeholder. We would also see more emphasis on economic ties and perhaps stronger military relations.
 Fish, M.Steven. “The Inner Asian Anomaly: Mongolia’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34, no. 3 (September 2001). P. 323
 Burnell, From Assistance to Appraising, p. 414
 Ibid., p. 421
 Democracy Index 2011
 Democracy Index 2010
 Democracy Index 2008
 Democracy Index 2006
 Freedom House, 2002-2012
 As reported by the Embassy of Mongolia in the United States of American: http://www.mongolianembassy.us/mongolia_and_usa/us_mongolia_friendship_caucus.php. (Accessed on December 4, 2012).
 As reported on IRI’s official website: http://www.iri.org/countries-and-programs/asia/mongolia (Accessed on December 4, 2012).
 “Ambassador Addelton’s Remarks at the Asia Society Breakfast: Warm Relations in a Cold Place: The United States and Mongolia,” Embassy of the United States in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, June 14, 2011. http://mongolia.usembassy.gov/speeches_061411.html (Accessed on December 4, 2012).
 The White House, U.S.-Mongolia Joint Statement
 See the Community of Democracies official website: http://community-democracies.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=3
 Noerper, Ten Things We Get from Mongolia. p. 1
 Narangoa, Preventative Diplomacy, p. 373
 Wachman, NBR, p. 5
 “Secretary General welomes Mongolia to OSCE, stresses added value to security community,” OSCE News (November 22, 2012). (Accessed on December 4, 2012).
 Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton Following the Legislative Elections in Mongolia on 28 June 2012, 2012.
 European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
 “U.S. Envoy on Mongolia as OSCE Participating State,” IIP Digital (November 22, 2012). http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2012/11/20121123139050.html#axzz2E82SDh1V (Accessed on December 4, 2012).
 “EU supports Mongolia’s Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) sector with 7 mln euro project,” Delegation of European Union to Mongolia, May 31, 2012. http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mongolia/press_corner/all_news/news/2012/20120531_01_en.htm (Accessed on December 4, 2012).
 For more information on KAS, please see: http://www.kas.de/mongolei/en/ (Accessed on December 4, 2012).
 As rated by Democracy Index
 Epstein, Democracy Promotion, p. 11
 Concept of Foreign Policy, Section II, Article 8
 The Concept of National Security of Mongolia, Section IV
The following is part 2 in the series of posts pulling off of my M.A. thesis, posted here. In this post, I present the second two theoretical contributions: small power. I argued in the previous post that small states do not have hard power options and argue in this post that soft power is an inappropriate tool for understanding small state foreign policy behavior. Rather, small power presents new possibilities.
In the absence of hard power capabilities, we may assume that soft power is the default option. Joseph Nye’s definition is simple enough: “It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.” He goes on to say that the basic logic is to get others to want what you want. A country with a relatively large population, territory, resources, economy, military force, and social stability might be able to coerce other nations into working with it to achieve its own security objectives. However, a state that has managed to cooperate with other states because of shared interests has proven itself adept at exercising soft power. Generally, international soft power is produced through three different spheres: 1) culture; 2) political values; 3) foreign policy. All three are combined to further a given state’s interests and its attractiveness to other states.
The literature on soft power is primarily concerned with the United States of America, and serves as an oppositional voice to the connection between American military power and the country’s foreign policy. The concern of many articles on soft power is to point out alternatives to hard power as a way to achieve U.S. security goals and foreign policy objectives.
Although soft power is a useful analytical concept, it has some notable limitations in its application to small state foreign policy. First, large and small states will approach power projection in very different ways. For example, Nye observed the connection between soft power and democracy, when he pointed out that “soft power is a staple of daily democratic politics.” It may be that democracies are more adept at utilizing their soft power resources, as a result of their familiarity with political concession making at home. It seems likely that larger powers, such as the U.S. or regional actors such as the E.U. may be more familiar with soft power as a PR-campaign. For smaller states, however, it may actually be the reverse: democracy is a source of soft power, not a teacher of it. In other words, small states might be able to use democracy to attract international partners, not as a way to train themselves for other modes of power projection. Second, while larger states might be able to depend on the attractiveness of their culture, smaller less-well-known countries will have to restrict themselves to the later two options (i.e. political values and foreign policy). Third, the concept of soft power assumes that hard power is an available option, as indicated by Nye’s concept of “smart power” as the ideal combination of the two, which any global power must harness to remain on top. When hard power is not available, the projection of softer resources is not necessarily soft power; rather it is the only power available.
By combining what we know about soft power, with the previously presented two-sided definition of small states, we can begin to refer to some small state-specific power, which I will call small power. Small power is an analytical concept for understanding how small states will make themselves appear more attractive for partnerships with larger, often extra-regional powers as part of an effort to discourage threats from other states, often their neighbors. Working within the modes of asymmetry and behaviors that I have previously laid out to identify small states in today’s international system, the concept that small states will almost invariably engage in some sort of specialized balancing behavior has already been established. Small power is thereby defined as the power to affect the international system by attracting the attention of larger, less-threatening powers in an effort to balance against the role of a threatening state. Small power is tailored for states that have limited economic and/or mineral wealth and without clear geo-strategic advantages. Small oil-producing states, for example, can leverage their natural resources in their foreign relations, and strategically located states can leverage their territory for foreign military installations. What can a state leverage to make itself an attractive partner, when it has neither economic nor strategic incentives?
Small states have utilized a number of strategies to increase their small power resources. A number of states have volunteered a symbolic number of military personnel to peacekeeping operations (ex. Georgia, Mongolia, and Poland are three prominent examples of small states currently contributing troops to U.S. operations in Afghanistan), others have worked to build records of consistent adherence to international norms, and still others have sought to act in line with regional interests to help foster stability (ex. South Korea and Thailand).
As of December 19th, my M.A. thesis was officially accepted, and I closed my M.A. Asia Pacific Policy Studies program. I was the first student in my program to write a thesis and finish in a year and half! Indeed, I am surprised it all worked out so smoothly with writing a thesis, taking 2 classes, applying to 8 PhD programs, and studying for the GRE!
The thesis, Small Power: Mongolia's Democratization and Foreign Policy Objectives, explores the following:
Small states are in a unique position, where they cannot hope to meet their foreign policyand security objectives through hard power. Rather, small states must balance against large neighbors via more subtle and nuanced ways. Through a critique of soft power, the author presents a new analytical framework for understanding small power and new criteria for defining “smallness” in today’s international system. Small power attempts to explain small state foreign policy decision-making and the role that “attractiveness” plays in their relations with larger states. One potential source of small power- democratic governance- is explored through a detailed look at the Mongolian model of democratization as a foreign policy tool in its “third neighbor policy”. Successful democratic transitions in small states can attract more security related,economic, and institutional support from leading democratic countries than their small size might initially suggest.
For anyone interested, my full thesis is available at http://hdl.handle.net/2429/43714
I am now on my way to California, where I will be awaiting decision letters from PhD programs and the Fulbright Commission. In the coming weeks/months, I will have more time for frequent posting, including a number of posts based on my research for the thesis, some impressions of my M.A. program, and a number of other topics fitting into SMALL MATTERS. I also intend to publish a number of short book reviews, which I hope will prove useful...to my 3 readers...;)
“Mongolia is important and Mongolian politics matter” is a phrase we don’t hear very often, neither from policy makers, politicians, nor academics. Still, with increased interest in Mongolia on the international stage, and several new Mongolian Studies projects being pursued by world-class universities, perhaps it is time to start asserting that SMALL MATTERS.
This website starts with a simple, although potentially groundbreaking, presumption: small states matter in international politics and security. In this post, I want to focus on why Mongolia matters, and some preliminary ideas on what international actors are looking for from Mongolia as related to the most recent elections. While Mongolia is by no means a world power, a sophisticated foreign policy coupled with a booming mining sector and proven democratic stability has allowed the country to attract international attention on a scale usually reserved for larger actors. I propose that the 2012 Parliamentary election was important for two interrelated reasons: 1) a show of democratic strength and commitment to democratic development; 2) a test of stability for the economic/investment climate.
As I have stated in previous posts, Mongolian democracy matters not only as a domestic regime, but also as a type of international PR. For example, Mongolia’s democratic system has streamlined its relations with the United States. Mongolia has enjoyed US military assistance in training and technology in exchange for its support of the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. Mongolia has contributed hundreds of troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and has stationed peacekeepers around the world as part of various UN missions. In fact, much of Mongolia’s defense forces have been converted into a well-trained international peacekeeping force, with plans to increase the number to 2,500. The US has carried out much of this training out in the annual Khaan Quest military exercises.
The US-Mongolian relationship is greatly strengthened by shared democratic values. The US and Mongolia are both committed to the rule of law and both governments gain their legitimacy as a result of the democratic process. Unlike the CCP in China, the Mongolian state’s legitimacy is not solely based on the ability to provide economic returns (although that is certainly a very important factor). Rather, Mongolian elections must also be seen as legitimately reflecting the voters’ decisions. Concerns over electoral fraud and corruption add an extra complication to the state’s legitimacy. However, to date there has been no proof of any fraudulent activity large enough to suggest that the whole election was bought, and as a result the in-coming MPs will be at least largely legitimate, even if not necessarily viewed as such by all their constituents.
This election is yet another brick in the wall of proof that Mongolia has implemented a largely successful democracy. As a democracy, it is better able to cooperate with other democratic players: nations that would otherwise have little interest in Mongolia. Turning to Mongolia’s larger foreign policy goals, we can see that relations with other democratic nations are a key factor in the country’s efforts to extend itself beyond its immediate neighborhood. Mongolia is surrounded by two huge, distinctly non-democratic countries- Russia and China- both of which have exercised varying amounts of control over its domestic policies in the past. Mongolia is distinctly aware of the fact that as a small country between giants its sovereignty and general ability to control its own domestic policies are anything but a given. In response to this potential complication/threat, Mongolia has implemented a policy of cultivating relations with other world actors outside of its immediate geography through what is widely referred to as the “Third Neighbor Policy”. Notably many of Mongolia’s “third neighbors” are stable democracies with good human rights records. These include Japan, South Korea, India, the US, and various EU countries (i.e. Germany, France, the Czech Republic, and several others). Investors in Mongolia do not have to justify the morality of their investments to the same extent that they might when investing in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, for example.
Shared democratic values, as demonstrated by successful elections such as the one this June, provide Mongolia with a way to deepen relations with other actors and address its larger foreign policy, security, and economic interests.
Mongolia’s economy grew over 17% in real terms this past year, making it the fastest growing economy in the world! This little fact is often shocking to people, who write of the country as part of an undefined “third world”. Of course, this is up 17% from a rather low starting point, but still this remains a sign of development and is perhaps indicative that international investment in the mining sector is paying off for the country in general. Without judging prematurely, it is clear that international investors were watching this election closely for two things: signs of instability and signs of populism-influenced protectionism in the Mongolian market.
“Do you expect a repeat of the events of 2008?” many people, foreigners and Mongolians alike, asked me during the build up to the election. For those of you unfamiliar with Mongolian politics, let me briefly explain. Following the announcement of an MPRP (now MPP) victory in the 2008 Parliamentary elections, the DP called a protest, saying that the elections were fraudulent and corrupt. Things quickly got out of control and what started as a peaceful protest outside the MPRP headquarters turned violent, resulting in 5 deaths, the complete destruction of the MPRP building, and the partial destruction of the Cultural Palace (located unfortunately close to the party building). I did not expect a repeat of these events this year, and I am very happy to have been proven correct. Even though the events of 2008 where contained by the morning, such riots are by their very nature unpredictable and international investors and observers were notably anxious that any such repeat might have the potential to spiral out of control.
Perhaps more importantly, investors want to ensure that their investments are protected and that their contracts with the Mongolian government will be honored. When Mongolia implemented a windfall tax overnight on mining profits in 2006, investors became acutely aware that the rules of the game could change at the drop of a hat. While the windfall profits tax legislation was eventually repealed in 2009, it remains something of a scandal, and worried many investors, while simultaneously scaring off others (presumably). While some Mongolian political players are more or less predictable and open to international investment, one party in particular had a particularly populist slant: the MPRP-MNDP “Justice” Coalition. Dr. Julian Dierkes previously identified the MRPR-MNDP vote as a sign of populism, citing the fact that supporters are often drawn to the message of standing up to international market forces as well as resource nationalism. After winning 11 seats in the Parliament and quite likely becoming part of a coalition with the DP, we might conclude that some elements of populism remain popular in the Mongolian political and social sphere. Indeed with rising xenophobia, this seems hardly surprising. (See my previous post on Fears of Survival). Whether this will will translate into harder times for international businesses in uncertain, but I would venture to guess not, seeing as the DP will the be leading figure in any coalition and it clearly pro-business.
Considering increased economic interest in Mongolia following a record year of growth as well as the PR potential of democracy and adherence to human rights norms, I conclude that this election had at least some level of importance to Mongolia’s international partners. Although, let me admit that while from Ulaanbaatar everything Mongolian seems significant, the likelihood that any international players were loosing sleep over this election is not likely. What is also interesting is the fact that, from what I could tell, none of the parties had any explicit foreign policy message in their action plans/policies. While I maintain that Mongolia exercises notable agency in its foreign policy decisions, as a small country a domestic political change cannot upset foreign policy to the same extent that Presidential elections in the USA can. (More on Mongolian agency and choices later).
Note: A version of this article was published in the July 23rd edition of the UB Post, Mongolia’s leading English-language newspaper. Hopefully, a link to follow.
Analysis, Thoughts, Ideas
This blog will be an online publishing site for smaller analytical projects, news stories that I find relevant to small state foreign policy and indigenous autonomy, as well as a testing ground for new ideas and new projects that I may pursue.