As President Obama declares that the US is preparing to boost its military presence in Europe to the tune of $1 billion, and NATO and the EU move quickly to deepen relations with Georgia and Moldova it is easy to conclude that the crisis in Ukraine and the recent actions of the Russian Federation are a very European issue. However, if we turn our attention to Mongolia, we can see that worsening US/EU relations with Russia are likely to have a far more global effect than may have been initially assumed.
Mongolia, for its part, seeks to simultaneously maintain good relations with its neighbors (Russia and China) while deepening relations with extra-regional powers such as EU member states, the US, Japan, and South Korea. While maintaining this balance and neutrality is difficult enough in a stable international environment, the recent increase in tensions between Russia and NATO/EU members has made playing both sides of the fence an increasingly delicate process.
The first sign that Mongolia was finding itself in an increasingly sticky situation appeared when the country chose to abstain from the UN resolution condemning the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Everything about Mongolian foreign policy and general international outlook would lead one to believe that Mongolian officials do not welcome Russia’s aggressive actions. Not only would Mongolia not be keen on Russia’s attempts to legitimize its actions by reference to historic rights and “arbitrary decisions” (this having the potential to set a precedent for claims on Mongolia’s territory by China), but this kind of action by a great power against a smaller neighbor more generally underlines Mongolia’s own vulnerability. That said, it is also clear that Mongolia is not in a position to upset its relations with the Russian Federation, given its importance to the Mongolian economy and its role as a neighboring balancer vis-à-vis China. “Abstain” was likely the only decision Mongolia could make.
It would appear that the Russian government is also watching how countries on its eastern borders will respond to the crisis in its relations with Europe and North America. Case in point: Russian President Putin met with Mongolian officials 2 times in just the last 3 weeks. The first time, Mongolian Prime Minister N. Altankhuyag met with Putin to discuss the two countries’ bilateral relationship at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. The second time, Putin met with Mongolian President Elbegdorj at the Confidence Building Measures in Asia meeting in Shanghai. Russia is eager to keep Mongolia from sliding towards the United States and Europe.
While I do not know if the current situation in Ukraine was discussed at these meetings, Ukraine was on the agenda during recent meetings between the Mongolian Minister of Foreign Affairs L. Bold and the British Minister of Foreign Affairs two weeks ago. I would also guess that U.S. Senators Steve Lynch and Steven Shabet mentioned the issue during their visit to Ulaanbaatar as part of an official tour of Asia.
Mongolia and other small states seeking to maintain relations with Russia and the “West” are going to find it increasingly difficult to maintain a favorable balance. As Russia becomes more assertive of its foreign policy and security interests, its relationship with NATO and EU member states is unlikely to improve. While Mongolia has navigated the international arena successfully for the past couple decades, that well thought-out success has a limit. As Mongolia’s international profile rises and relations between real and third neighbors deteriorate, I predict that Mongolia’s goal of an omni-directional foreign policy will become more and more difficult to maintain. Difficult, but by no means impossible.
(Many of the resources and links for the post came directly from my “Foreign Policy Roundup”, which be can found here).
I recently came across and article in The Atlantic, which reported that Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev had suggested that perhaps the suffix –stan was responsible for Kazakhstan’s low global profile. He mentioned Mongolia, as a country that continues to attract international attention despite its still small economy and population. Perhaps a name change would help Kazakhstan develop a stronger international profile, he mused.
There is really only one good Russian response to this: Здравствуйте! ('hello' or in this case more like a saracastic 'good morning'). On the one hand this could just have been a interesting idea that the President was playing around with, which has no serious implications for the future of the country or his perception of its position in world affairs. On the other hand, it could point to some serious misconceptions on Nazarbayev's part.
Let's start with the statement that Mongolia has somehow benefited as a result of not being called something like Mongolistan. But, for every available economic indicator, Kazakhstan greatly outperforms Mongolia. This is, naturally, to be expected. Kazakhstan is a oil producing state, has a much larger population, and was more developed at the dissolution of the Soviet Union, giving it a greater starting point. Just looking at FDI, Kazakhstan hosts a huge figure at $111.5 billion, while Mongolia stands at just $4.5 billion! Anecdotally, it is more that clear enough that many more businessmen, students, policy makers, and analysts take a direct interest in Kazakhstan than in Mongolia when it comes to current affairs (naturally, I would suspect that Mongolia can command more than its fair share of historians). While it is beyond the scope of this casual blog post to offer a full comparison, I feel confident in saying that Kazakhstan's international profile is significantly more pronounced than Mongolia's.
That said, I would suspect that Nazarbayev was more concerned with a different kind of indicator, namely something more related to soft power. (I detailed Mongolia's «small power» here). In this case, Mongolia is certainly outperforming Kazakhstan, and it has nothing to do with a little Perso-Turkic suffix. Mongolia is a proven democracy, and has consistently shown its committment to engaging with the international community and improving its own democratic credentials. While Mongolia has eshewed further deepening its relationship with the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan is part of the Eurasian Custom's Union and CIS, tieing it to the Russian Federation. While Mongolia has sought to further its relationship with the European Union and North America, Kazakhstan remains a difficult partner because of its authoritarian political system and continued abuses of basic civil/human rights. Even with these limitations, Kazakhstan does enjoy good relations with the E.U. and the United States, but the relationship remains limited, largely as a result of Kazakhstan's own domestic and foreign policy choices. While Mongolia has sought to rise above its own geographical position, Kazakhstan's leadership continues to avoid a more balanced relationship with the Russian Federation, to the direct detriment of its other foreign policy goals. (In fact, Kazakhstan's political system is also a key reason for the underdeveloped nature of Kazakhstan-Mongolian relations, outlined here).
At the end of the day, Kazakhstan's economy is stronger and its economic ties to North America and Europe outperform Mongolia on most indicators. If Kazakhstan has any lessons to learn from Mongolia it is that democracy matters as much as a domestic policy as a lever for diplomatic relations. Democracy matters, names and suffixs don't.
(This is a new fun category of posts where I imagine a scenario where foreign policy news leads to a 100% shift in international politics. I am not arguing that my scenario should or will happen; I am arguing that if this one piece of news went to an extreme, that we could expect the following changes in global politics.)
Just imagine, Russian policy makers give 100% to all their talk about shifting their developmental, foreign policy, and security focus to the Russian Far East and East Asia.
In another decade or two, the Russian Federation could have potentially achieved the following foreign policy milestones:
1) Deepened relations with China. True, Russian-Chinese relations aren’t all that bad now, but if the Russian Federation really devoted its diplomatic energies and expertise to East Asia, Moscow might be more willing to cooperate with China. China likewise would have to treat Russia as an Asian great power, incentivizing Beijing to cooperate at Russia’s bequest.
2) Solved its territorial disputes with Japan. If Russia is serious about becoming an Asia-Pacific power, it will have to solve its territorial dispute with Japan over the Sakhalin Islands. Moving east will not mitigate the U.S. encirclement of Russia, and Russia would be wise to court Tokyo instead of working against Japan as it likes to do with U.S. and NATO allies in Eastern Europe. This way, it could make room for itself in the region as a new player.
3) Turned itself into a stabilizing force on the Korean Peninsula. Russia will have to take an active role in stabilizing the Korean Peninsula. Russia might begin to partner with China to control Pyongyang, while simultaneously seeking to increase its standing in South Korea, to balance the U.S. presence in its new backdoor.
4) Become a balancing force against China in Mongolia. Certainly, Mongolia is focused on balancing the economic and political influence of its two giant neighbors, but currently China is really the only neighbor that needs to be balanced. A bit more interest from Russia coupled with continued third neighbor involvement might be just the thing to counter the obvious threat posed by the Chinese vasselization of the Mongolian economy.
For Russia’s neighbors, we could expect the following benefits:
1) Russia would treat the South Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and the Baltics as secondary concern. That is not to say the Russia would stop behaving like an imperialist state towards these regions, but they would become a lesser concern if the Kremlin was focusing on Vladivostok instead of St. Petersburg. Georgia and Armenia would be freed up for integration into European institutions, the Baltics would face less pressure from Russia concerning Russian minorities in these countries, and Eastern Europe might not be bullied around with energy politics quite as much.
2) Central Asia would become slightly more relevant. Central Asia is pivotal to Russian-Chinese relations as a main point of competition AND cooperation, mainly through the SCO. As such, Central Asia would become more important than it already is to Russian and Chinese grand strategy. Getting the region right will be paramount to achieving strong relations with China, and ensuring the stability of the region.
3) The E.U. would feel less pressure. With Russia’s move away from Eastern Europe, E.U. expansion into the Caucasus would be simplified (still difficult and far away, to be sure). Furthermore, European sponsored pipelines would face less competition from Gazprom, furthering E.U. security and economic interests.
4) The U.S. would feel more pressure. If Russia was successful at turning itself into a recognizably Asia Pacific country, the U.S. would have to deal with another pole in the region, making its own pivot more complicated and delicate. A Russian-Chinese partnership could also give both countries the upper hand in denying the U.S. access to important regions, diplomatically and economically. If Russia was successful in courting Japan and South Korea, the U.S. could find its own alliances weakened by Russian influence. Also, a stronger Russian military presence in the Pacific would be a direct security threat to the United States (and Canada, for that matter).
Domestically, an Asia-Pacific Russian Federation would experience the following changes:
1) Eastern Demographic movement. Moscow and St. Petersburg would not loose their political and cultural significance, but an eastward moving Russia would mean that Irkutsk and Vladivostok, etc. would suddenly become the pillars of the Russian economy and key point of interaction with the Asia-Pacific.
2) More interference in Sakha and Tuva. The Sakha and Tuvan Republics are 2 of three more “independent” republics of the Federation, with Moscow decidedly less involved in their domestic affairs (Tatarstan being the 3rd of such republics). Our imaginary Russia would probably start interfering much more in these republics. In Tuva, one of the few republics with a majority titular demographic, the eastward move could also lead to an influx of Russians, potentially causing social unrest.
3) More balanced relations with North Caucasus and other more western ethnic republics. With less interest in Western affairs, the Western republics might get a bit more flexibility to pursue their own interests. Obviously, this will stop short of any real policy change, but with less interest Mother Russia might not notice key developments in regional agency.
This list is far from complete and a far cry from well researched, but I think I have touched on several important possibilities from the scenario.
In reality, I find it hard to imagine that Russia could successfully mould itself into a real player in Asia-Pacific affairs for one simple reason: Russia rarely displays foreign policy behavior that would attract other countries to welcome its presence. In order for this move to work, Russia would have successfully interact with South Korea and Japan; however, Russia has not shown itself particularly adept at working with U.S. allies in the past. While Putin might consider Russia already to be an Asia-Pacific country, I do not believe that the rest of the region would agree. In order to make political room for itself, Russia will have to charm, something the state has never been particularly gifted at.
Last week Foreign Policy published an article on how Russia’s energy policy has pushed Europe and Asia to find alternatives to Gazprom. No surprise here. It is the quintessential flaw in all Russian government policies: the strongman approach. Russia continually miscalculates its own strength, offering only the stick with very little carrot. The country is locked in a time when Moscow controlled a huge swath of the globe, including Central Asia and Eastern Europe. It seems that Moscow is unable to accept that countries like Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan are not only independent from the Russian Federation, but have options besides Moscow for international partnerships. Sorry Putin, there is no such thing as the “near abroad” (ближнее зарубежье), anymore. Much of Eastern Europe is effectively integrated into NATO and the E.U.; the South Caucasus has cultivated strong relations with Turkey and the “West”; and even Central Asia is starting to loosen its Russian chains with China, India, and the U.S. eager to move in.
The most exciting part of the article is that it shows how small states are actually benefiting from a belligerent Russia. Wouldn’t we assume that small countries neighboring large, aggressive states would suffer as a result, bullied into policy changes and controlled from outside: their de facto autonomy weakened and pulled into “satellite state” status? Indeed, this seems to often have been the case. Historically, it was certainly the case for Russia’s neighbors until just recently. I identify three important takeaways from this article (in the context of post-1990 developments): 1) spheres of influence are dead; 2) even powerful states can over play their hand; 3) small states adapt quickly.
The term “sphere of influence” declined in use with the end of colonialism/WWII, but the general idea can still drive policy making on the part of large powers. Russia certainly still finds the term relevant with frequent references to a so-called “near abroad” (the term used for post-Soviet countries, suggesting that they are not fully independent of Moscow, essentially referring to a sphere of influence), and a persisting sense that Russia can and should play a special role in post-Soviet countries. A “sphere of influence”, whereby de jure independent states are under the de facto control of a large power, and that other large powers are not permitted to engage within this sphere no longer exists. Today, as Petersen’s article shows, Russia is not the only country engaging in the post-Soviet space, and in the case of Eastern Europe and some of the South Caucasus, it is not even the main player. True, much of Central Asia (especially Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) does not seem terribly eager to run away from Russia, and are even looking for an expanded role for the CIS and Customs Union. But, even these nations are increasingly able to step away from Moscow for security, economic, and energy needs/sales. Most Eastern European states are now firmly under the NATO security umbrella, and have the resources of the European Union to balance against dependency on Russia. Turkey, the U.S., and some E.U. member states are active in the South Caucasus. The Central Asian states are courted by the E.U. and U.S. for global security concerns, and China and India are moving in for geostrategic and energy-related reasons. Russia no longer has a recognizable exclusive sphere of influence or a “near abroad”, something Russia policymaking appears to be slow to realize.
Russia is laboring under the one of the biggest foreign policy flaws that powerful countries can and often do make: might makes right, or, to use a more classical cliché, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. The assumption is that since Russia is strong, its neighbors can’t afford to do without it. I am not arguing that Russia’s neighbors can actually ignore it, but since these states no longer exist in an exclusive sphere of influence, they have choices. Had Russia opted for a non-confrontational stance and worked with the newly independent states as opposed to undermining their legitimacy and autonomous decision-making processes, the countries of Eastern Europe might have effectively straddled the space between Europe-proper and Russia, to their own benefit (Finland is a clear example). The South Caucasus and Central Asia have been more willing to cooperate with Russia, because they do not have the security of the E.U. or NATO to cushion the fall, but they have been persuaded to stay closer to Russia if Moscow was a reliable and benevolent ally. As Russia increasingly looses its foothold even in Central Asia, where up until a decade ago its position was entrenched, one can’t help but declare a complete policy failure. Russia overestimated what it could get away with, and now it is looking increasingly isolated.
Finally, this is yet another example of how small states are not only highly adaptable, but also able to make independent policy decisions with whom they do and do not cultivate international partnerships. Small states may lack the ability to make their own rules, but they are more than capable of choosing by whose rules to play. Russia pushed Europe to find energy alternatives, and Europe did just that: forging partnerships with the states along the Caspian Sea and building pipelines through Turkey. Now Gazprom’s profits have fallen 15%, and with it Russia’s control over neighboring energy resources. Small states will seek to cultivate relations with as many players as possible, with a clear preference for extra-regional/non-neighboring countries. Such a strategy is essential for small states to maintain their autonomy and independence. When Europe opens it doors to energy resources from outside the Gazprom monopoly, small states are going to respond. Likewise, when Russia makes unfriendly policies towards its neighbors, they are effectively justifying and encouraging those same countries to further entrench with the “West”. Georgia and Ukraine are two clear examples. Dr. Drezner argued in a recent article that low energy prices might actually promote instability since oil producing states rely on high prices to fund their own stability. This is certainly true in Putin’s Russia, where his popularity is largely based on petroleum-bankrolled development. However, for the smaller states bordering Russia, it appears to be the opposite.
Talk of a “new great game” should shift to a “global great game”, not confined to Central Asia, but an emerging trend throughout the international state system in response to new emerging powers and re-engagement by established global leaders. The basic policy considerations presented here are necessary considerations for larger states to effectively interact with smaller countries. As this article has pointed out, small certainly does matter in energy politics, when small states are necessary producers and transit countries for petroleum resources. While the same points hold for the U.S. and China as much as the Russian Federation, the difference is that the U.S. and China have already taken actions in this direction. China reiterates its “peaceful rise”, and the United States promotes itself as a “benign hegemon”. Mistakes are made and small states remain suspicious of China’s rise and America’s pivot, but it seems that China and U.S. have won this soft power battle in the “global great game”. Russia will have to significantly adjust its foreign policy ideology to win the war.
As I was reviewing FP's daily cover story, Westward Ho!, I started thinking about the so-called Great Game, between the Russian Empire and Great Britain in the 1800s. After reading Peter Hopkirk's The Great Game and Thomas Barfield's Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History, it seems natural that I would immediately look back for perspective on current developments. As China considers moving west to ensure Central Asian stability, and the U.S. simultaneously seeks stability in this resource-rich, sparsely populated, and (depending on country and locale) terrorism-heavy region its hard to avoid the handy "Great Game" comparison. I do, however, have some thoughts on why this comparison is inappropriate:
1. The great powers in this Great Game are far more numerous today, and the intentions far more diverse than the simple goals of Britain and Russia to expand their empires. Today's Central Asia is of interest to China for the reasons mentioned by Yun Sun in the article above. India has a direct interest in curtailing Chinese influence; the U.S. wants to ensure that Central Asia does not become a permanent base of operations for Islamic fundamentalism. The E.U. wants to ensure a steady energy supply, and Russia is still keen to remain the predominant power in its so-called "Near Abroad". All these overlapping interests and state-specific goals means that Central Asia is not the Emirate oasis that is was during the original Great Game.
2. Central Asia is for the first time in its history divided into nation-states, delineated by [flawed] ethnic lines. These states can now respond and play with larger powers on a more even basis. During the Great Game, Afghanistan, under Dost Mohammad, was an inefficient and poorly-operating pseudo-state. The Uzbek Emirates, Khiva, Bokhara, etc. were little more than city states, and the Turkmen had no functioning authority at all. Any modern version of the Great Game would have to take into account the interests of the states it overlaps with. Agency may be the biggest difference in contemporary Central Asia.
While these are just some initial thoughts, I think they both have serious implications for any comparison that might come out of articles such the one above. The main difference may actually be that today's Great Game might actually help the small states stuck in the middle. Central Asia now has new leverage in its relationship with all external parties...and that is certainly small power.
On January 15, Foreign Affairs released an intriguing essay on Azerbaijan's relations with Iran and Israel (here). Not only did I learn a lot about Azerbaijani foreign policy, but it also got me thinking that Azerbaijan might be another example of a small state implementing what I called "small power" in a previous post, albeit in a way very different from Mongolia.
Alex Vatanta presents compelling evidence that tensions between the U.S./Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran are evidenced in the newly developing ties that Azerbaijan enjoys with Israel and its tense relationship with Iran. Azerbaijan has had a remarkably fraught relationship with its southern neighbor. These tensions are the result of several historical and contemporary issues. The most important for our purposes being the following:
1) More ethnic Azeris live in the Northern Iran than in Azerbaijan, the declared homeland of the Azeri people.
2) Occasional remarks from Iranian politicians suggest that they still see the South Caucasus as part of their historical domain/rightful sphere of influence.
3) Iran supported Armenia over Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, fearing that Azerbaijan might be trying to unite the "greater Azeri nation".
In response, Azerbaijan as sought closer ties not only with the Russian Federation, but also with the United States. More surprising to me, however, was that Azerbaijan and Israel are showing ties of increased cooperation. Both countries have an expressed interest in seeing Iran contained, monitored, and ultimately subdued as a regional threat. In response, Iran has attempted to improve relations with Azerbaijan, with overtures including the release of Azerbaijan citizens accused of spying in Iran and other diplomatic motions.
I suggest that Azerbaijan has taken steps that look an awful lot like "small power". It seems to me that Azerbaijan is developing a policy of subtle balancing behavior, whereby it can best achieve its foreign policy and security goals. By maintaining ties with Russia, but also bringing the "West" and Israel into the mix, Azerbaijan can ensure two things: one, it is not dependent on any one larger country; two, Iran is now in a position to take Azerbaijan seriously. Iran's previous heavy-handedness pushed Azerbaijan to take measures to ensure that Iran did not become a threat. Now, Iran will have to court this small Caucasian nation, to ensure that Azerbaijan does not become a larger concern than its small size and population might have suggested in the early 90s. The alternative, that Iran take actions against Azerbaijan, seems unlikely since Azerbaijan has not taken any definitive action against Iran and a pre-emptive strike would only worsen Iran's geo-political climate. Azerbaijan has played its hand well, and it seems to be working.
Anyone familiar with Mongolia, has likely noted important parallels between the three points of contention in Iran-Azerbaijan relations, laid out by Alex Vatanta, and the historically complex relationship between Mongolia and China. More ethnic Mongolians live in Inner Mongolia than the Mongolian state; there are occasional statements of Mongolia's natural place within the Chinese nation (like Tibet and Xinjiang/East Turkestan), and China has expressed concerns about pan-Mongolianism affecting the security and stability of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Mongolia's response has been remarkably similar to Azerbaijan's, in that the country has sought to deepen relations with countries besides its two neighbors - the "third neighbor policy". The differences are numerous (ex. Mongolian-Chinese official relations are quite good at this time and the U.S.-Chinese relationship is hugely better than U.S.-Iranian relations), but the similarities are also important and point to my larger argument that internationally engaged small states will take similar foreign policy directions with regard to their strategic environment. Azerbaijan, like Mongolia, can leverage certain things (location, ties with the West, love-less relationship with Iran) to increase its "small power" and ultimately further its foreign policy and security objectives.
Part 3 of the summary posts of my M.A. thesis will detail how and why the United States and Europe support international democratization. This post is integral to understanding the final post, which will detail what this means for small states using Mongolia as a detailed case study.
The European Union and the United States of America have been the leading forces in global democratization. The United States’ primary goal has been to increase global security through democratization support. The E.U., on the other hand, has been largely focused on fostering democratization in Eastern Europe as a step towards EU integration, and has only recently displayed real interest in extra-regional democratization efforts.
THE UNITED STATES
While U.S. foreign policy has favored democracies since the country’s independence, it was in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that the promotion of democracy became a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and tied directly to the nation’s security. Democracy was viewed as essential for long-term stability and fighting terrorism around the globe. In the post-9/11 world, democratization became a U.S. strategic priority, being tied to two important concepts in democratization literature: democratic peace theory and the instability of authoritarian regimes. The Democratic Peace Theory maintains that democracies do not go to war with each other, meaning that with more democracies the world would be “safer” and more prosperous, thus furthering U.S. global and regional interests. A key caveat, however, is that the democratic peace theory seems to only apply to mature/established democracies, whereas transitional governments have proven far less stable. Democracy is supposed to facilitate long-term economic growth by allowing for the freedom of expression and innovation as well as promoting rule of law, which can foster predictability for investors and control corruption.
In terms of actually policy making, the U.S. has several key programs, including USAID and NED. USAID reported $1.5 billion dollars of expenditures directly related to the promotion of democracy in 2004; the National Endowment for Democracy provides funding for the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute for their non-governmental assistance to developing democracies. Through these programs the United States is able to reward democratizing regimes and further its own international interests.
EUROPE/ EUROPEAN UNION
The E.U. is the largest regional promoter of democracy; but the fact that it is comprised of sovereign member states, limits the extent to which one can identify a common foreign policy theme. However, the E.U. does possess several important mechanisms to further its democratization agenda, including membership privileges and a developing reputation as a moral international actor. The 2012 announcement that the E.U. would be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, underscores the E.U.’s achievements as a force for democratization and, by extension, global stability and human rights.
In order to begin the process of obtaining E.U. membership, states must demonstrate a commitment to democracy and human rights. E.U. membership, by extension, not only carries a number of important economic advantages, but also provides some level of security as well. Organizations such as the E.U. constrain the larger powers’ options and work to level the playing field between large and small states by awarding each country an equal vote. The “leverage”, provided by economic and security incentives, is integral to understanding the democratization of Eastern Europe.
While the U.S. can rely on the federal government as a direct source of democratization funding and support, the E.U. is more fragmented and as such democratization efforts are largely on a country-by-country basis. The largest democracy-promoters in the E.U. include the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, Britain’s Westminster Foundation for Democracy, and Germany’s Stiftungen. While the E.U.’s foreign policy is largely handled by each of its member states individually, the promotion of democracy is probably the most accessible means to further its security interests. Democracy is both a goal and an instrument of European foreign policy, meaning that not only does the E.U. foster democratization for the stability and peace that are assumed to arise from this form of governance, but it also recognizes that simply by appearing to support democratization, the E.U. is looked upon more favorably. While the E.U. was devoted to the democratization of Eastern Europe immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, today Europe is looking to promote democracy in various strategic areas, such as Central/Inner Asia and the Caucasus.
The European Parliament, through such initiatives as the European Foundation for Democracy through Partnership (EPD), the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, and the Democracy Caucus at the European Parliament, takes an active role in pan-E.U. foreign policy.
 Lagon, Mark P. Promoting Democracy : The Whys and Hows for the United States and the International Community. New York City, 2011. p. 3
 Dalacoura, Katerina. “US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion in the Middle East : Theoretical Perspectives and Policy Recommendations.” Ortadogu Etutleri 2, no. 3 (2010). p. 60
 Epstein, Democracy Promotion, p. 8
 Lagon, Promoting Democracy, p. 2
 Burnell, From Assistance to Appraising, p. 416
 Wivel, Small E.U. Member States, p. 395
 Ibid. p. 423
 Wivel, Small E.U. Member States, p. 416
 Olsen, Democracy as a Foreign Policy Instrument, p. 143
 Ibid., p. 144
Analysis, Thoughts, Ideas
This blog will be an online publishing site for smaller analytical projects, news stories that I find relevant to small state foreign policy and indigenous autonomy, as well as a testing ground for new ideas and new projects that I may pursue.